Twins defense: Some fun with numbers
Posted on April 1st, 2009 – 10:41 PMBy Joe Christensen
FORT MYERS, FLA. — John Dewan, author of “The Fielding Bible,” was kind enough to grant my interview request on short notice this week, and since then, it’s been a lot of fun stretching my brain, trying to highlight some of his research for Star Tribune readers.
(For an around-the-horn look at the Twins, please don’t miss this chart.)
Volume II of “The Fielding Bible” was released last month, with chapters by Bill James and all that incredible data generated by Baseball Information Systems. Basically, a team of video scouts watches every pitch of every game, tracks every batted ball — where it’s hit (as in Vector 197), how hard it’s hit, and how every fielder reacts.
There are some terrific defensive metrics out there, such as The Hardball Times’ Revised Zone Rating, and now Dewan has equated defense into another useful category, called runs saved.
Consider that the Tampa Bay Rays went from a minus-71 (71 runs lost defensively) two years ago, to a plus-26 (26 runs saved) last year, and it helped put them in the World Series.
I focused much of my story on Carlos Gomez, who gets his own chapter in Dewan’s new book, but one of our astute editors, Jeff Rivers, had some good questions about other Twins:
1) Joe Crede obviously has been a standout defensive player in the past, but how did he rate so well last year, despite committing 20 errors in limited playing time (834.7 innings)?
Crede’s rating has declined, but he was so good in 2006 (24 runs saved), he had plenty of room to fall and still be above average. Crede was given a minus-8 on balls hit to his right last year, but his quick reflexes and soft hands helped him get a plus-15 on balls hit directly to him, and he was plus-7 on balls to his left. Added up, Crede was a plus-10, meaning he saved the White Sox 10 runs.
2) Why was Alexi Casilla’s rating (minus-3) so average?
Casilla had some real highs and lows. Consider his “good plays” or plays made when it appears they shouldn’t be made. Casilla had 47 good plays in 834 innings, or 17 more than an average second baseman would have made in that span. But Casilla also had 27 misplays and errors, four more than an average second baseman would have made in that span.
Casilla is quick, but he was minus-11 on balls hit to his right, compared to plus-9 on balls hit to his left. Even with his above average ability to turn the double play, he came out as a minus-2 overall, a far cry from Philadelphia 2B Chase Utley, who was plus-33.
Another example of how deep this book goes: In one chapter, James takes particular aim at Delmon Young, who led all major league left fielders with 29 defensive “misplays,” which don’t count as official errors. On Page 31, James lists the complete breakdown and includes the following:
(*) Mishandled a ball after a safe hit, allowing runners to advance (5 times)
(*) Dived for ball and didn’t catch it, let it get behind him (4)
(*) Chased a ball to the wall, allowing it to bounce off the wall over his head (3)
(*) Fly ball hit his glove and bounced off (not scored as an error) (2)
(*) Took a bad route to the ball (2)
(*) Missed the cutoff man, allowing runner to advance (1)
(*) Other misplays (12 times)
It’s worth noting, however, that Young was an above average right fielder with Tampa Bay. He was a plus-7 in 2007, which ranked him 10th among major league right fielders.
The Twins put him in left field, which is the toughest outfield position to play at the Metrodome because of the lights (just ask Jacque Jones). As the Scouting Report section of Dewan’s book notes, “[Young] has youth on his side, so improvement is likely. He has a long way to go.”


